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Patterns of cleavage development in the late Ottoman Empire and Khedival and British Egypt: Intr societal and extrasocietal determinants of opposition radicalization

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Abstract

The article analyzes the domestic dynamics of the political systems of the late Ottoman Empire and Khedival and British Egypt, aiming to determine the causes of radicalization of the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers (MB) and the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) as political parties in a comparative perspective. The study demonstrates that the nature of the two groups was determined by the constraints imposed by the political system upon party development. Constructed on the basis of the first predominant ideological cleavage, the political system and its actors were in turn shaped by the degree of penetration of foreign pressures into domestic politics. The first section of the article focuses on the impact of foreign pressures on the institutionalization of political cleavages, by examining modernizing reforms' trajectories and elite development. The second section analyzes the CUP and the MB as emergent externally created parties originating from the synthesis of intrasocietal and extrasocietal dimensions of the political systems in which they emerged.

Keywords: The Committee of Union and Progress, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Political Parties, Radicalization, Islamism, Political Cleavage, Political Elites;

The Middle East and North Africa region has been bypassed by the third wave of democratization and the post-Cold War spread of democratic institutions. If academic curiosities grew into significant policy dilemmas after the 9/11 attacks, the Arab Spring has brought into the spotlight the ongoing unrest resulted from the relation between states, political actors and civil

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society. The consequent rise of political Islamism has challenged the authoritarian status quo, exposing “the failures of the mechanisms and channels through which state institutions have traditionally been controlled and the political trajectory of the state effected”¹.

Archetypes of political participation, political cleavages have been gradually decanting into incipient political parties since the second half of the XIXth century. The capacity of political groups to aggregate political representation in the region expanded and witnessed mutations after the First World War, due to of above imposed political regimes and everlasting authoritarianism. As the region’s prospects for democratization have been shattered by violence and oppression, the prerequisites that led to the radicalization of Islamist political groups should be understood as the convergence of various patterns of political mobilization and authoritarianism. If political systems and political parties are directly affected by the historical circumstances shaping the environment in which they commence, then a comprehensive understanding of the nature of political actors in MENA requires a special attention to the early stages of political participation. The article is concerned with understanding the institutionalization of political cleavages in the caucus and mass party eras as framework of analysis for two political groups with divergent ideologies, that radicalized in opposition: the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt (MB).

The first part of the study focuses on the impact of foreign pressures on the institutionalization of political cleavages, by examining modernizing reforms’ trajectories and elite development. The second section analyses the two political groups as emergent externally created parties. The goal of the article is to prove that the configuration of political systems determined the ideological orientation and radicalization of the two groups. If the CUP and the Egyptian MB were radical mass political parties that had similar positions in the political system, similar organizational structures and radical, yet opposite ideological orientations, then their nature is a result of the configuration of intrasocietal and extrasocietal dimensions of the political systems.

The Model

The model assumes “violence flows from efforts of social or functional classes to maintain or improve their positions relative to others”³, resembling

¹ Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi and Lauren Banko, “Introduction to political parties in the Middle East: historical trajectories and future prospects”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol .44, No. 2, 2017, p.156.

group conflict theory. Mixing internal social dynamics and external pressures in a similar fashion to David Easton's depiction of the *intrasocietal* and *extrasocietal* dimensions of political systems, Theda Skocpol's correlation between the incapacity of the state to perform its functions and state crisis provides three levels of analysis. These are the failure of the state to institutionalize inclusive political competition, the emergence of significant marginal elites manifesting themselves as intellectual movements and the incapacity of the state to exercise diplomatic representation and individual foreign policy.

Firstly, Skocpol's combination of Marxist and Weberian traditionalism indicates that the political system cannot separate itself from the web of power relationships operating at the level of society. Secondly, she accounts the importance of the world system's pressures in shaping group dynamics at domestic level: by failing to exercise foreign policy, the pressures of the international world system are not filtered by the state, hence generating mutations in the development of domestic politics. Thirdly, the failure of the state to act as a non-ideological implementer of the social contract can determine the emergence and ideological orientation of marginal elites.

As the analysis focuses on patterns of ideological cleavage formation in the center of an Empire and a province struggling for autonomy, the validity of the unit of analysis is based on deprioritizing the state. Because the study looks at the pre-caucus, caucus and mass-party eras of representation in MENA, the conceptual representation of the administrative body defining the space of domestic politics cannot be equated with the definition of the state, which is the *de facto* expression of modernity. Hence, the domestic political arena is not delimited by sovereignty, but, resembling Easton's model². Thus, it is defined as an organized political community encompassing all individuals, social groups, institutions and interactions among them, which function in a regulated or irregular setting and whom connect and relate to each other, without assimilating inputs from the international arena through a formal system.

Viewing the state as a partaker instead of a regulator transforms the latter in one of the groups engaged in competition, conflict and cooperation for

² According to David Easton, the system of analysis comprises the *intrasocietal* and *extrasocietal* environment; the *intrasocietal* environment consists of "those systems in the society as the political system which are not political systems due to our definition of the nature of political interactions. *Intrasocietal* systems include such sets of behavior, attitudes, and ideas as the economy, culture, social structure and personalities; they are functional segments of the society which the political system is itself a component [...]. The *extrasocietal* includes all those systems that lie outside the given society itself. They are functional components of all international society, a *suprasystem* of which any single society is part. [...] Taken together, these two classes of systems comprise the total environment of political system." (David Easton, *Varieties of political theory*, Prentice-Hall, USA, 1966).

maintaining or acquiring the control of the mechanisms mirroring a modern state. Similarly, Peter Mair depicts that “political parties are the agencies through which groups, and thus their members, participate in politics, make demands on the state, and ultimately attempt to capture control of the state”³.

Theories of political parties/party systems represent the foundation for the analysis of *internal social dynamics* or the *intrasocietal system*. Having at its core historical context, the model is based on the argument that the circumstances under which political parties arise in a developing political system are the determinants of the nature of the political parties which subsequently emerge. Consequently, Katz and Mair argue that “the factors facilitating this dialectic do not derive solely from changes in the civil society, but also from changes in the relations between parties and the state”⁴ (the graphic representation of this theory accounts the position of *the political party* in relation to *the state* and *the civil society*, as represented in the Figure 1, 2 and 3).

The model omits both the institutionalization of the groups analyzed as political parties and the state’s modern identity and functions, allowing an approach resembling group conflict theory in tackling the relation between them, by applying a party system rationale. The work of Arend Lijphart and Stein Rokkan represent the foundation for understanding political system structure and cleavage. Whereas Arda Can Kumbaracibasi’s approach on the study of political institutionalization of the AKP⁵ leadership was used as source of inspiration for tackling the reign of Abdülhamid the IInd, by adapting Angelo Panebianco’s “trade-off” model - a dilemma of leadership where one dimension of the political group needs to be traded-off to enhance the other.

The Impact of Foreign Policy on Modernizing Reform

Modernizing transitions are greatly influenced by “reciprocal relationships between social units”⁶. Mixing Barrington Moore’s analysis of class relationships along the course of social change and Immanuel Wallerstein’s international world system, Skocpol considers society by default international, arguing its dynamics cannot be understood without considering

³ Peter Mair, *Party System Change Approaches and Interpretations*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997, p.94.

⁴ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy The Emergence of the Cartel Party”, in *Party Politics*, Vol.1. No.1 pp. 5 – 28, 2005, p.6.

⁵ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/The Justice and Development Party in Turkey.

⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, *World System Analysis – An Introduction*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2004.

international factors. Furthermore, by understanding foreign induced pressures in terms of military competition between political entities placed on different locations within the world system, political systems can be defined as “a system of behavior imbedded in an environment to the influences of which the political system itself is exposed and in turn reacts”⁷. By assuming that the exercise of sovereign foreign policy is a determinant in the development of domestic politics, the following section looks at the nature and impact of foreign policy on modernizing reform in the late Ottoman Empire and Colonial Egypt.

In the XIXth century Ottoman Empire debates on how to modernize the nation and make the army powerful again sprung concomitantly with the decline of the Empire. Seeking solutions for its revival while facing strong foreign adversaries paved the way for elite modernization and renewal. In the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries “the Ottoman rulers looked at the indigenous solutions”⁸ and believed they could limit their “reform-imports” to Western technology, keeping a distance from cultural aspects. This proved impossible, the Ottomans facing, by the end of the XVIIIth century, the need to transplant institutions, political and even philosophical infrastructure from the West.

Two outcomes of direct foreign pressures facilitated the progress of future representation within domestic politics in the central administration of the Empire. One is that all major reforms of the XIXth century could be accounted as reactions to the decline of the Empire. The other one underlines that the necessity of strategic diplomatic representation triggered a developmental process within the ruling class. The Tanzimat can be considered a result of the decline of the Empire – if the army needed to be strengthened, the financial system needed to be reformed to provide new resources; the acute necessity of keeping up with its direct competitors on the world scene triggered the need of new specialists in all fields of activity. Since the Karlowitz Peace Treaty of 1699, the international world system pressures became more and more vivid for the Ottomans. The disastrous Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca concluding the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-74 and launching the “Eastern Question”, brought “the Russians to the Black Sea and put them into a position where they could take the Crimea and intervene in the Principalities”⁹. Equally, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt (1798) stimulated the demands to end political decentralization in the Empire and to reassert Sultanic authority. Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) responded with reforms that laid

⁷ David Easton, *Varieties of political theory* ... cit., p.2.

⁸ Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz _12September_Turkey's Current Challenges in Foreign Policy & Domestic Issues; [video file]; <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pa1YabaAdM>>, consulted at Sept. 20, 2015.

⁹ Stanford J. Shaw, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: Nizām-ı Cedīdi Army of Sultan Selim III, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 37, No. 3, September 1965, The University of Chicago Press, p.291.

the basis for the Tanzimat.

Was the Ottoman Empire a dormant society revived by the European Enlightenment? In constant territorial retreat since the Siege of Vienna, the beginning of the Ottoman Empire's decline could be equated with Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent's death, in 1566. However, the legitimacy of the Ottoman Empire remained intact, even during the rebellions against the Sultan. The general opinion among scholars holds that Ottomans took little interests beyond their borders except when they were likely to affect them, creating the episode during which the French revolutionary forces occupied the Eastern Mediterranean as the leading cause for the "westernization" of the Empire through reform. Thus, the Napoleonic phase was a key to a new period of rapid change, "one that added a quantum leap forward to an ongoing process"¹⁰. Some scholars also argue "reforms were already taking place in 1793, at least in the field of gathering intelligence, [indicating] fundamental change in the psyche of the Ottoman political order"¹¹.

The process of introducing new European technologies did not occur sharply at the beginning of the period labeled as the Tanzimat, but since the Nizām-ı Cedīd¹. Described in literature as a "vigilant reformist who had a plan to reform the decaying institutions of the Empire even before his accession [...] Selim III is usually glorified as an early champion of westernizing institutions"¹². As far as he was concerned, "the Empire was in difficulty because the traditional institutions were not being operated properly"¹³. Sultan Selim III's agenda shifted significantly to military reforms beginning with 1792, when he became concerned with improving the quality of military equipment, introducing by 1793 contemporary European technologies to manufacture cannons, rifles, mines and gunpowder.

Since a political system is "imbedded in an environment and subject to possible environmental influences that threaten to drive the essential variables of the system beyond their critical range"¹⁴, reforms introduced within the military triggered multi-dimensional reform within the Empire. Therefore, in Weberian terms, the New Order marked "the beginnings of the transition from

¹⁰ Dror Ze'evi, "Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East" in *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Volume 19, June 2014, p. 86.

¹¹ Fatih Yesil, "Looking at the French Revolution through Ottoman eyes: Ebubekir Ratib Efendi's observations" in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 70, No. 2, 2007, Cambridge University Press, p. 283.

¹² Betül Başaran, *Selim III, Social Control and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the Eighteenth Century: Between Crisis and Order*, Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 2014, p.75.

¹³ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I Empire of the Gazis- The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press, USA, 1976, p.260.

¹⁴ David Easton, *Varieties of political theory ... cit.*, p.150.

‘traditional’ towards ‘rational-legal’ authority”¹⁵. To finance the new order¹⁶, Selim set up a new treasury and transformed the existing School of Mathematics into the military Land Engineering School and Naval Engineering School: “if Liberal ideas were introduced in economics, they would have to be introduced in politics as well”¹⁷, bringing about an acceptance on the Sultans’ behalf that non-Muslim subjects would establish their own community schools¹⁸. Attention was now given to printing and to the circulation of Western translations, and young Turks were sent to Europe to study. Modernity required “increased access to information, domestically on the Empire and externally abroad, therefore an advisory council of experts”¹⁹ was established, putting the basis of the future Turkish foreign ministry²⁰. The European industrial revolution added up to Küçük Kaynarca, Jossi and to the Ottoman-British commercial treaty of 1839, “adversely affecting the Empire in the XIXth century and being instrumental in its final collapse”²¹. While the eastwards flow of European goods increased significantly by the end of the first quarter of the XIXth century, the extensive and costly Ottoman industrial efforts of the 1840s “have been dismissed as the casual if not comical games of disinterested bureaucrats”²².

Defence depended of diplomacy, as the Sultan was faced with finding a strategy against intruders from outside based on signals of possession, since physical attacks on foreign organisms were avoidable²³. The necessity of

¹⁵ Carter Vaughn Findley, “The Tanzimat”, Resat Kasaba (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2008, pp.11-37, p.12.

¹⁶ Three views aiming to cure the empire from its weaknesses by reforming the army emerged: (1) totally reverting to earlier military methods; (2) merging the old with the new – European techniques; (3) radical eradication of the old structures and replacing them with the new. Selim tried to opt for the second approach, but the Jannaiseries opposed his reform efforts (the introduction of new organizations, tactics and weapons). Thus, Selim saw himself in the position of establishing a new infantry unit trained and equipped in accordance to European standards. (Fatma Muge Gocek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past, Turkish Present, and Collective Violence against the Armenians, 1789-2009*, Oxford University Press, USA, 2014, p.84).

¹⁷ Carter Vaughn Findley, “The Tanzimat... cit”., p.13.

¹⁸ The Empire witnessed a fast multiplication of community schools for non-Muslims.

¹⁹ Fatma Muge Gocek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past ...cit.*, p.85.

²⁰ Although none of the two institutions survived Selim III’s rule, they laid the foundations for the future Tanzimat, since those trained within them formed “the seeds of the reformist officials and officers who eventually dictated the course of modernity first in the empire and later in the republic” (Fatma Muge Gocek, *Denial of Violence: Ottoman Past ...cit.*, p.84).

²¹ Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Jan. 1974, Cambridge University Press, p.65.

²² Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution... cit”., p.65.

²³ Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, Derek Urwin (ed), *State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics in Europe - The Theory of Stein Rokkan*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p.109.

constructing comprehensive foreign policy demonstrated the importance of civil elites, especially diplomats, who became influential also in domestic politics. The Tanzimat represented a period of “continuation and intensification of reform”²⁴. In reaction to the intensifying foreign pressures that the Empire had to respond to, Ottoman rulers became more aware of the need of international civil cooperation for the survival of the Empire.

While the Porte was struggling to respond to the domestic issues within its Millet system, the destabilizing wave within its borders turned into an opportunity for other foreign powerful actors to act against it. Ever since the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, the European powers seized momentum to intervene in the regions that were under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Although Egypt remained under Ottoman domination officially until 1914, by 1840 the region witnessed a series of local crises that marked the politicization of religious and ethnic differences, to which the declining Empire could not respond anymore, exclusively, by military means.

Although “Abdülhamid’s use of Islam and his attempts to raise the hopes of Ottoman Muslims have been received with hostility by Europeans”²⁵, his rule witnessed an important spring of modernization. While the place occupied by him in the modernization history of the Empire is contested by some historians whom criticized his authoritarianism, if modernization does breed revolution²⁶, facts prove otherwise. During his rule, Abdülhamid showed the deepening importance of foreign policy for the development of the domestic political arena. The complicated situation in the midst of which Abdülhamid acceded to throne²⁷ reinforced his anxieties: the Empire was unable to meet its obligations in concerning its foreign debt, the growing nationalist feelings in the Balkans were complicating the international relations of the Eastern Question, while the Great Powers of the time were showing signs of changing agendas. While Britain became increasingly interested in the Suez Canal, the Ottomans witnessed Russian involvement in the Balkans. Forced to sign a humiliating peace at San Stefano, Abdülhamid’s “main objectives were preserving peace [and] developing a strategic plan to cope with the threats represented by the

²⁴ Edward C. Clark, “The Ottoman Industrial Revolution ... cit’’, p.65.

²⁵ Benjamin C. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II”, Resat Kasaba (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 38 – 61, p.40.

²⁶ Charles Tilly, “Does Modernization Breed Revolution?”, in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Special Issue on Revolution and Social Change, April 1973.

²⁷ The Balkans were effervescent and inflamed by Tsarist Russia, while Britain was losing its counterweight to Russia’s status in the eyes of the Ottomans. After a coup carried out by various high-ranking officials against Abdülhamid’s uncle and Murad Vth’s incapacity to continue ruling, Abdülhamid acceded to throne and faced himself two *coups d’état* s in the first years of his ruling.

various interests of the Great Powers”²⁸. Whereas Crete and Lebanon were sinking into crisis, the penetration of Europeans increased; the 1848 nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and the 1856 Crimean War outcomes that culminated with the 1877 war, gave the Tsarist Empire the opportunity to claim protectorate of Orthodoxy, deepening the breach in Ottoman sovereignty. The purpose of the Gülhane Edict, which is considered to mark the beginning of the Tanzimat, can be defined as means to “prevent European States from intervening in internal affairs of the Ottoman State, while providing closeness with European States and saving the State from regression by taking help from them in the Mehmed Ali Pasha Rebellion”²⁹.

The gradual increase of the importance of diplomacy triggered the development of civilian elites: Mustafa Reşid, Kececizad Fuad and Mehmed Emin Ali, whom served both as foreign ministers and Grand Visers, came to shape the period. Mustafa Reşid Pasa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time was to author *The Hatt-i Şerif of Gulhane*, the document that steered officially the period of *the Tanzimat*, on November third, 1839, shortly after the death of Sultan Mahmud II.

If domestic politics was a matter of foreign politics for the Turkish elites, foreign politics was accounted in Egypt in terms of domestic politics; however, assessing the impact of Ottoman dominance in Egypt’s political participation’s future is challenging, because the role played by both the state and elites changes. In both Mamluk Egypt and Egypt under the Ali dynasty, the ruling elites were actively involved in creating cultural models: it was the elites whom introduced in the XIXth century western cultural models, as it happened in future Turkey. Yet, conditions were different in Ottoman Egypt: “the role of the state and elites underwent an important change, resulting in a dislocation of some of its structures”³⁰. Egypt moved from being the center of an Empire to a province – the complex bureaucratic structure of the XVth century was reduced, Ottomanization being applied mainly in administration, which proved to be the core of modernizing reform in future Turkey. By lacking its own administration, the reforming process that led to the renewal of the elite class in Istanbul did not take place in Cairo, because Egypt was led by Ottoman bureaucrats. Furthermore, if in the case of the Empire defense depended on diplomacy, in the case of late Ottoman Egypt defense depended directly on maintaining the monopoly on the use of force. While the central actors in Istanbul were already struggling to find non-confrontational solutions for the decline of the Empire in

²⁸ Benjamin c. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II ...cit’”, p.47.

²⁹ Zabit Acer, “Ottoman Modernization and Effects pf the Tanzimat Edict Today” in *Ozean Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2009, p.190.

³⁰ Sukru Hanioglu, “The Second Constitutional Period, 1908–1918”, Resat Kasaba (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 4 - Turkey in The Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 62 – 111, p.88.

the face of foreign threat, Egypt continued its violent struggle towards autonomy.

The Ottoman central government had already lost its ability to direct affairs of Egypt in the XVIIth century, by losing control over the leading positions in the administration and the garrison corps. Soon, its remaining representatives could not stop the locals from penetrating the institutions in Egypt. Without the power to control locally based military households, the central government in Istanbul resorted to sending Ottoman governors in Egypt with secret orders to bring down locals that dominated the military and the financial life. As a result, by the time Muhammad Ali's seizure of power ended a long three-way civil war between the Ottoman Turks, Egyptian Mamluks, and Albanian mercenaries (1803 - 1807), the necessity of a military ruling class became imminent: a power group arose in Ottoman Egypt because of the faceoff between two institutions of military slavery: the Mamluk and the Ottoman. Accordingly, "this slave-recruited manpower was the backbone of the army, and of the administration"³¹, was isolated from the surrounding society and was considered a force to be reckoned with in the early XIXth century. Having fought against Napoleon's forces and the Ottomans, the warrior-nobles standing as Egyptian local elites made their presence in the region felt – by the second half of the XVIIth century the Mamluk leaders "did not fear to assassinate governors or to refuse them entry into Cairo, but rather assumed themselves the executive powers of the absent governor"³². Because of the lack of conducting diplomatic endeavors, the elite de-militarization process that sprung by the time the Jannasaïres were abolished in Istanbul, was impeded in Egypt.

Reform: Degree of Autonomy and Class Circulation

Influenced partly by the existence or lack of foreign policy, the impact of domestic policies on elite-development was to trigger divergent developments of incipient participation. If the Tanzimat was a period of gradual liberalization of the political arena in the center of the Empire, in the case of Egypt, the XIXth century Muhammad Ali dynasty's rule was to bring about the opposite.

The Gülhane Imperial Edict (1839) is considered by most historians a mark of the unfolding and intensification of reform at the core of the Empire - calling for reforms in taxation, military recruitment procedures and judicial procedure, it proved to be "less of a westernizing measure that has commonly

³¹ Gabriel Piterberg, "The Formation of an Ottoman Egyptian Elite in the 18th Century" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3, August 1990, Cambridge University Press, p.275.

³² Daniel Cercelîus, "Egypt in the eighteenth century", M.W Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.61.

been assumed”³³. However, it set forth the principles “that allowed effective executive and legislative power to pass from the monarch to the bureaucracy and representative bodies”³⁴, laying the foundation for “an appropriate balance between nobility and monarchic power”³⁵, which for Moore stands as a precondition required for a society to develop into a liberal constitutional and democratic political regime.

While in future Turkey elites were on the road towards acquiring autonomy, Muhammad Ali, the Khedive of Egypt, managed to “end Mamluk power and to create a loyal elite composed of members of his own family, of friends and acquaintances and of members of the expanding bureaucracy that he founded”³⁶. A new ruling class arose isolated from the realities of the civil society and served exclusively the ruler’s purpose in both domestic and foreign politics: to tighten his grip on power. In contrast, the Gülhane cancelled the arbitrary punishments of the Sultan that elites were subject of during the rule of Selim IIIrd and Mahmud II, allowing elites to acquire a form of autonomy, by giving them the space to act independently from the monarch in the incipient phase of the caucus representation progression. The provision also motivated the ruling elite to act independently in order to keep the decree in force.

Unfolding after the Gülhane, The Islahat Ferman of 1856 proclaimed “Ottoman subjects of all religions eligible for official appointment according to their ability and opened civil and military schools to non-Muslims”³⁷. The principles on which it was based had two noteworthy effects: if class circulation was possible, the non-elite as well as the non-governing elite had (at least in theory) the possibility to join the governing elite, defined as the sum of individuals „who wear labels appropriate to political offices of a certain altitude”³⁸; not only class circulation was now possible vertically, the Gülhane decree introduced horizontal class circulation in the center of the Empire, by ensuring equality among subjects from different religious communities³⁹.

³³ Benjamin C. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II ... cit”, p.40.

³⁴ Marvin E. Gettleman, Stuart Schaar, *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader: An Historical Reader for the 21st Century*, Grove/Atlantic, USA, 2012.

³⁵ Barrington Moore Jr., *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: Lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966.

³⁶ Darrel Dykstra, “The French occupation of Egypt”, M.W Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.139.

³⁷ Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire...cit.*, p.19.

³⁸ Vilfredo Pareto, “The Mind and Society” (excerpt), Joseph S. Roucek, *Classics in Political Science*, Rowman & Littlefield, USA, 1963, p.261.

³⁹ The Gülhane introduced guarantees to all subject living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire for the security of their life, honor and fortune – although it reflected British liberal thinking, the proclamation never stated that Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were equal – still conforming to Islamic law, the principles stated within it are to be applied without exception to both Muslims and members of other communities.

On the other side, Ali established structurally the Cabinet and Advisory Council; ministers were all dismissed and appointed by Ali personally and major decisions were made by the ruler himself.” the Advisory Council, which was composed of government officials, religious scholars, noblemen, gentry and other personalities, only met once a year to review proposals⁴⁰. Thus, in his fight for consolidating power, Ali deepened the gap between the civil society and the state, by constructing a highly oligarchic system. Ali’s dictatorship and expansionism and the containment and besiege by the European powers from outside Egypt drowned reforms and impeded the development of political elites. Springing from the failed attempts to modernization and because of the lack of class circulation, the Urabi Revolution (1881-82) was an outburst aiming to build a bridge between the civil society and the state. Soon after the 1876 bankruptcy of Egypt that forced Khedive Isma’il (1863-1879) to the British and French Dual Control in his Government, Colonel Ahmed Urabi started gathering support for a nationalist movement aiming to “roll back Anglo-French financial and political predominance, the Turco-Circassian monopoly on high military posts, and the authority of the Khedive”⁴¹.

Khedive Tawfiq (1879-1892) was supported by the Europeans and his oligarchy: Muhammad Sharif’s clique of wealthy Turco-Circassian “constitutionalists”, liberal Syrian Christian journalists, parliamentary deputies who were also great provincial landlords or wealthy merchants, and some indigenous officials and *ulama*. On the other side of the cleavage were indigenous Egyptian army officers, some provincial landlords and parliamentary deputies and village shaykhs. However, the rebellion of domestic elites was ended in 1882 by the British occupation of Egypt, which engrained the rulers - ruled dichotomy as foreign – local. Furthermore, the end of the revolution witnessed some of the richest indigenous landowners and merchants welcoming General Garnet Wolseley to Cairo, cancelling any path towards elite autonomy and sharpening the cleavage, as the Ali dynasty survived at an ultimately fatal price in legitimacy and power: “after the catastrophe of 1882, it remained for the revolutionaries of 1919 and 1952 to take up again the cause of Egypt for the Egyptians”⁴².

As the struggle of the Great Powers to control Egypt ended, Egypt kept departing from Ottoman influence, now ruled by a small group of British military-backed Europeans. In December 1882 Sir Evelyn Wood was appointed to raise a new Egyptian army under British officers. Political reform was instrumentalized to serve British interests, wearing the guise of democratic

⁴⁰ Pan Guang, “Revelations of Muhammad Ali’s Reform for Egyptian National Governance”, *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies* (in Asia), Vol.7, No. 4, 2013, p.20.

⁴¹ Donald Malcolm Reid, “The Urabi Revolution and the British conquest, 1879-1882”, M.W Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.217.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p.238.

practice: the Khedival system was retained, together with the annual tribute to the Ottoman Sultan, while an influx of British officials seemed to supplant Egyptian bureaucracy. British advisors were appointed to the principal ministries, British advice was expected to be followed and administrative control tightened around claims of efficiency – political and financial stability were necessary, so the British would consider evacuation.

Beginning with 1923, European constitutionalism was introduced in Egypt; however, the lack of an indigenous politically strong bourgeoisie and the excessive powers of the British controlled monarchy represented a limited form of self-government: “for thirty years, King Ahmad Fu'ad and his son Faruq subverted the constitutional process and opposed the nationalist movement [and] as a result, while Egypt exhibited the structure of western-style constitutionalism, its practice was regularly compromised by the palace and its appointed ministers”⁴³. Despite a multiplicity of political parties, elections, parliamentary sessions, and freedom of the press and associations, the constitution was repeatedly ignored, suspended, and even at times altered, while no political organization successfully exercised a brake on the dominance of the king.

Institutionalizing Ideological Cleavage

Panebianco's institutionalization dilemma

Angelo Panebianco identifies two dimensions of party institutionalization, which he considers to be positively correlated: *autonomy* and *systemness*. In his terms, the degree of institutionalization of a party should be measured by the degree of autonomy towards the entity's environment and the degree of independence of its different internal sectors (systemness). If the state/the governing entity is considered a body aiming to improve its position relative to others, then one can define (1) autonomy as the degree of dependency on foreign inputs and (2) systemness as degree of dependency on domestic inputs. In the light of this reasoning, Kumbaracibasi's correlation could explain the variation of the ideological orientation of the governing, by assuming that (a) Islamism increases popular support and foreign hostility and (b) secularism decreases popular support and foreign hostility.

In the case of the Ottoman Empire, Panebianco's strategic dilemma was determined by both variables: due to the entity's sovereign nature, the latter had the capacity to compete in the world system, processing inputs both from foreign and domestic actors as to maintain the status-quo; hence, Abdülhamid was compelled to moderate his ideology in order to balance the two: reforms

⁴³ Selma Botman, “The liberal age, 1923-1952”, M.W Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.286.

that would concomitantly strengthen relations with constituents and maintain non-belligerent relations with the Great Powers. On the other hand, by relying exclusively on maintaining the monopoly on the use of force, the post 1882 Khedivate only processed foreign inputs which determined its secular nature and its lack of moderation (Figure 4).

If in the international arena Abdülhamid's re-Islamisation approach has been received with hostility by Europeans, the intricate domestic circumstances that reinforced his anxieties concerning his political fragility augmented his vulnerability to foreign pressures: "far greater danger to his reign came in the form of the war with Russia during the years of 1877-1878. This conflict was devastating for the Ottoman Empire and instrumental in shaping the subsequent course of the Hamidian era"⁴⁴. The Sultan's policies were subject of pressures both from below – the revolts that broke against tax collectors and the emotive nature of the revolts' religious and national implications, and from above – Abdülhamid's constitutional attempts aiming to diminish the need for European involvement in Ottoman affairs, by ensuring a passive reception of western influence. The Ottoman Constitution of 1876, promulgated by the Sultan acting under the pressure of a small group of reformist bureaucrats was prepared not by a representative constituent assembly, but by a special committee appointed by the Sultan himself. The committee was composed of a total of 28 members, including two members of the military establishment, 16 civilian bureaucrats (of whom three were Christians), and 10 religious scholars (Ulema). Within the committee, the reformers headed by the Prime Minister Midhat Pasa were a minority. Therefore, the final text reflected a compromise between the reformers and the conservatives supported by the Sultan. Although the Constitution fell short of establishing a parliamentary monarchy, the monarch's role was restricted essentially to ceremonial and symbolic matters. Nevertheless, even this limited experience in constitutional government proved too much for Abdülhamid, who prorogued the Chamber of Deputies indefinitely in 1878 and returned to absolutist rule for 30 years. The influence of Western liberalism, however, continued and expanded under his authoritarian rule.

Vertical periphery

The ideology of the governing dictated the nature of the "critical junctures determining subsequent political development and leading to long-term alignments between social groups"⁴⁵; by influencing the development of the conflict structure and its translation into politics, largely the latter could be

⁴⁴ Benjamin c. Fortna, "The reign of Abdulhamid II ...cit", p.44.

⁴⁵ Simon Bornschier, "Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies" in *Living Reviews in Democracy*, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich, October 2009, p.2.

considered to have shaped political cleavages in the two political systems.

Building on the work of Stein Rokkan, Bartolini and Mair conceptualize political cleavage as a dichotomy comprising a social structural element, an element of collective identity and an organizational manifestation in the form of collective action. In other words, “a structural division is transformed into a cleavage if a political actor gives coherence and organized political expression to what otherwise are inchoate and fragmentary beliefs”⁴⁶. Furthermore, in their study of Stein Rokkan’s theory, Flora, Kuhlne and Urwin argue that analysis of political systems should start from a notion of territory, introducing a distinction between ‘centers’ and ‘peripheries’. However, the concept of periphery treated exclusively in geographic terms refers only to the horizontal dimension of peripherality; whereas if the space is defined as “the totality of a system of interaction, within which the center consists of a key set of decision-makers, while the periphery is composed of those sets of participants in this system who have the least influence”⁴⁷, then the concept of peripherality gains a vertical dimension.

Thus, if the emergent state was a partaker instead of a regulator, then the first form of cleavage would spring vertically, in the framework of foreign versus domestic dichotomy, as “social change in the region has been throughout history the result of the interplay between indigenous and exogenous forces”⁴⁸. In the case of Egypt, the dichotomy translated into a cleavage between the rulers and the ruled, since foreign pressures penetrated the political formation (Figure 5): to tighten the grip on power, the rulers of Egypt responded to these pressures by exclusively representing the interests of foreign actors instead of their constituents, truncating the future of political representation. Witnessing the replacement of its local elites via the British intervention and the coercive European-imposed secularism, Egypt remained a province of the Ottoman Empire, and the dynasty founded by Muhammad 'Ali continued to rule, imposing “sniping deft and stiff-necked management in Cairo”⁴⁹. If as a province of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was a *periphery*⁵⁰ in political and economic terms, after the British occupation unfolded, secularization brought about cultural exclusion, facilitating the emergence and radicalization of anti-Western opposition.

⁴⁶ Hanspeter Kriesi, “The transformation of cleavage politics: The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture” in *European Journal of Political Research*, No. 33, 1998, p. 166.

⁴⁷ Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, Derek Urwin (ed), *State Formation ... cit.*, p.108.

⁴⁸ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960, p. 385.

⁴⁹ M. W. Daly, “The British Occupation, 1882-1922”, M.W Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt Volume Two – Modern Egypt from 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Histories Online, 2008, p.240.

⁵⁰ *Periphery* defined as one subordinate unit in a system, where the center represents the seat of authority.

On the other side, even during his authoritarian rule, Sultan Abdülhamid saw the need to develop a strategic plan to cope with the threats of the Great Powers, since, as argued by Rokkan, “success and failures of different modes of expansion also determine the internal structures of political systems”⁵¹ (Figure 6). Loyalty and manpower were needed to achieve a sound, practical basis of social solidarity among the majority of his subjects: producing civil servants who were both capable and loyal was a major preoccupation for the Hamidian government – in the early 1880s the Tanzimat reforms were extended to an empire-wide education system; despite his promotion of Islamic policy, the Sultan did not direct educational changes through religious hierarchy and established a parallel system through the French inspired Public Education Regulation of 1869. Still, the Imperial tradition and Islamic morality “naturally played a heavy role as the state attempted to use education to cement loyalty and affinity in its young subjects”⁵².

The position of the cleavage was to determine the ideology of the radicalizing opposition: if in the case of Egypt, reactionary radicalism took the form of Islamism, in the case of future Turkey, radicalism emerged in a secular form: as pan-Islamism became mainstream through the educational system, a particular group that emerged as the Young Turks opposition movement was to shape the look of radical opposition. Two conclusions derive from the current analysis of cleavage development patterns. Firstly, Caramani’s assumption that the processes of state formation and external boundary building have been crucial in structuring political cleavage, applies to the current comparison. Secondly, if past cleavage structures do reflect upon the structure of contemporary party systems as expressed by Rokkan’s “freezing hypothesis”, then the nature of contemporary political systems in the region is somewhat dependent on the caucus era of political parties.

Translating segmental cleavages: political parties

Since “political parties are the principal institutional means for translating segmental cleavages into the political realm”⁵³ and “the term ‘party’ also applies to conspiratorial groups aiming at the violent overthrow of existing regimes”⁵⁴, the following chapter intends to compare two groups that emerged and radicalized in opposition within the two analyzed systems: the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and the Committee of Union and Progress in the Ottoman Empire.

⁵¹ Peter Flora, Stein Kuhlne, Derek Urwin (ed), *State Formation ... cit.*, p.109.

⁵² Benjamin c. Fortna, “The reign of Abdulhamid II ...cit.”, p.52.

⁵³ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration*, Yale University Press, USA, 1977, p.83.

⁵⁴ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), *The Politics of Developing Areas ... cit.*, p. 391.

Definitions of political parties are various and treat numerous dimensions. For Burke, a political party is “an organized assembly of men, united for working together for the national interest, according to the principle they agreed upon”⁵⁵. For Gunther and Diamond, “parties are channels of intermediation between political elites and voters”⁵⁶. For Schumpeter, “a party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power”⁵⁷. In Aron’s terms, “political parties are voluntary groups, pretending, in name of a certain concept of common interest and society, to assume alone or in a coalition the functions of government”⁵⁸.

Based on Weiner and LaPalombara’s assumption that parties rise “in the midst of great historical developments which affected them and which in turn were affected by them”⁵⁹, the comparison will look at the (1) organizational and (2) ideological dimensions of the two groups.

The CUP and the MB are treated as mass parties in accordance to Gunther and Diamond’s definition and as externally created parties, in Duverger’s terms: both had “the self-conscious determination of leaders at both national and local levels to capture and to hold decision-making power alone or in coalition with others, not simply to influence the exercise of power”⁶⁰; both were characterized by a large base of members who remained permanently active in party affairs during non-electoral periods; in an effort to disseminate the party’s ideology and establish an active membership base, both sought to penetrate into a number of spheres of social life and had extensive arrays of supportive organizations; they emerged outside the Legislative, involved a challenge to the ruling group and a demand for representation and modernization, had a strongly articulated ideology and a nationalistic or an anti-colonial rhetoric, while posing discipline among its adherents and aggressiveness in making demands on the system.

Organization

The CUP and the MB manifested permanent organization at the local level, with regularized communications and relationships between units. The

⁵⁵ Kay Lawson, *Political Parties and Democracy*, Volume 5, July 2010, ABC-CLIO, Introduction (xix);

⁵⁶ Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties A New Typology”, in *Party Politics*, Vol.9, No.2, Sage University Press, 2003, p. 173.

⁵⁷ Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper Perennial Modern Thought, USA, 2008, p. 283.

⁵⁸ Raymond Aron, *Democracy and Totalitarianism*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, UK, 1968, p.71.

⁵⁹ Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (ed.), *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, p.6.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p.6.

General Congress of the CUP constituted the decision-making body of the organization, met annually and was composed of members of the Central Committee, deputies and senators, representatives of the local organizations and clubs, general inspectors, and editors of the Committee's official publications; it revised organizational regulations and appointed the Central Committee members - "a secretive board of 7 to 12 individuals, which issued directives to the formal institutions of state: the cabinet, the military and the bureaucracy"⁶¹.

In 1930 the first regulations to govern the operation of the MB came into existence. The organizational hierarchy of the Society was based on the tripartite division between the General Guide, the General Guidance Council and the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly held annual meetings and was composed of 100 to 150 members "endowed with morality, culture and practicality"⁶². The General Guide was elected and could be removed by the Consultative Assembly at a meeting attended by no less than four-fifths of its members and a majority. The General Guidance Council was formed of 12 to 15 members of the Consultative Assembly and elected by ballot, members holding office for 2 years. The MB had a Secretary General, a Treasurer, General Headquarters and six committees: policy, legal, statistics, services and legal opinions.

Both the CUP and the Society sought in some manner popular support, aiming to "penetrate all spheres of society"⁶³. The CUP formed two departments in this respect: a Provincial Organization Department and a Department of Clubs. A separate department coordinating activity in Istanbul retained its independence. The Central Committee presided over several Special Branches, which dealt with organizational matters in various sectors, such as women, the Ulema, provincial centers, local and district centers, and military and civil clubs. If at the dawn of the MB Hassan Al-Banna targeted the Ulama, the sheikhs of the Sufi orders, the leading families and the social and religious societies, by 1940 the organization had 10 sections concerned with ideology or indoctrination: propagation of the message, labour, peasants, family, students, liaison with the Islamic world, bodily training, professions, press and translations and the Muslim Sisters.

Paramilitary Branches

The Secret Apparatus (MB) and The Special Organization (CUP) undertook violent actions that aimed to protect the "beneficiaries" of their

⁶¹ Gabor Agoston, Bruce Alan Masters, *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, Infobase Publishing, 2010, Turkey, p.140.

⁶² Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, p. 163.

⁶³ Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, "Species of Political Parties...cit.", p.189.

ideologies. The CUP recruited army officers and assassins who swore to obey orders. As in the case of the MB, these activities initially occurred outside the borders of the targeted political formation: the Caucasus and Russia in the case of the CUP and Palestine in the case of the MB⁶⁴. In both cases, “secrecy was necessary to maintain the organizations’ solvency and assure its survival”⁶⁵, the paramilitaries of the two becoming determinant for their ability to challenge political regimes.

Welfare and Education: state versus party

By the early 1880s, Abdülhamid focused on implementing the plans for an empire-wide education system and increasingly treated his subjects as citizens (in the legal, medical, fiscal, military and census-taking fields). While the inspiration of the education system was foreign, Abdülhamid made efforts to make it consonant with Ottoman and Islamic traditions. In reaction, “Young Turk students organized secret gatherings where [secular] illegal publications would be read collectively”⁶⁶.

In the case of Egypt, the failure of the state to provide proper secular education gave the opportunity to the MB to support Islamic education and establish a Section of Welfare and Social Services, which extended in two years to over 500 branches. While invoking Islamic values, the MB attracted support from “the poor and the marginalized middle class [by] performing a wide range of social welfare functions which aided in recruiting and solidifying the loyalty of the members”⁶⁷. The significant discrepancy between the two systems can be seen in the numeracy estimates of the populations (Figure 7).

Ideology

Although criticized by numerous behaviorists for her “world-historically available model”⁶⁸, the current analysis is based on Theda Skocpol’s non-voluntarist perception, where ideology is regarded as an anonymous, collective and transformable entity that is a direct result of the circumstances

⁶⁴ In 1937, the battalions were formed concomitantly with the development of the Brothers’ concern for Palestine.

⁶⁵ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers ... cit.*, p. 31.

⁶⁶ Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline*, BRILL, Leiden, 2001, p. 268.

⁶⁷ Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p.183.

⁶⁸ William H. Sewell, Jr., “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 57, No. 1, March 1985, The University of Chicago Press, p.6.

created by the system the party emerges in; similarly, Aron and Schumpeter interpret ideology as the anthem of political imposition. Therefore, the Marxist approach to the definition of political parties, namely considering them the organization of the most conscious elements of a social class is applicable, if extrapolating from the concept of social class to any group of individuals that share a common restraint given as a result of their position within the system, and who believe in a common solution for improving their position in relation to other actors in society or the society in a holistic perspective. Hence, ideology occurs as an accident of historical circumstances only to inevitably become a tool and will be accounted in this comparison to underline its coincidental nature.

By the turn of the twentieth century, the cleavage manifesting both in Egyptian and Turkish identity emerged between the modernists and the Islamic revivalists. The modernists argued that renaissance was possible only through embracing western values and benefitting from their social, cultural and political products, proposing secularization. Islamic revivalists, on the other hand, argued that western technological advancements could be congruent with Islamic values and stop the decline of the Empire or liberate Egypt from foreign occupation.

Although their political formulas⁶⁹ differed, the MB resting on supernatural beliefs and the CUP upon concepts which appeared to be rational, both used the notions of popular sovereignty and tyrannicide to justify their legitimacy through “placing limitation on the authority of kings”⁷⁰ as efforts to restrict autocratic regimes and to save the electorate from “religious, cultural, political, economic, social, legal and moral decadence and impotence”⁷¹. Furthermore, both affected “the course of history among the peoples in the Middle East and [...] were the first to approach the social, political and cultural transformation of their society”⁷². The CUP’s manifesto of July 3rd, 1908 to the authorities of Ohri clearly stated that “the reason for insurrection was to combat the injustices and inequities that the fatherland has been suffering for many years”⁷³.

The CUP and the MB where rigid and exclusive, constituting “well-defined social groups, membership in which is bound up in all aspects of the individual’s life”⁷⁴. The CUP aimed to restore the constitution of 1876⁷⁵,

⁶⁹ Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, McGraw-Hill Publishers, New York, 1939, p.52.

⁷⁰ Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (ed.), *Political Parties ... cit.*, p. 3.

⁷¹ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers ... cit.*, p. 212.

⁷² Kemal H. Karpat, “The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3. July 1975, Introduction.

⁷³ Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks, The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics*, Hurst Company, London, 2010, p.5.

⁷⁴ Peter Mair, *Party System Change ... cit.*, p. 94.

⁷⁵ The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 inaugurated the Second Constitutional Period of the Empire, which lasted until the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The Young Turk

becoming itself a link in the historical chain of Ottoman bureaucratic westernization⁷⁶, which was considered an easy mission for Ottomans: “not only the civilized Ottoman, but even the ordinary Muslim peasant who resided within the borders of the Sublime State was more competent than the cleverest European”⁷⁷. Although also founded “to pursue a broad reform agenda”⁷⁸, the MB’s “arrogation to itself of the exclusive authority to interpret God’s will gave its ideology a coercive tone”⁷⁹.

The CUP reunited various factions that were generically referred to as the Young Turks. The name of Committee of Union and Progress, became official during a reunion of the Behaeddin Shakir faction in 1906. By the 1902 CUP Paris Congress, clashes among the internal factions of the CUP materialized in the shape of Ottomanism⁸⁰ versus Turkishness - where the latter was to prevail.

Ahmed Riza⁸¹, one of the lead proponents of the creation of the Turkish nation-state, advocated in the *Meşveret* periodical for centralization and limitation of separatism. Influenced by positivist, Darwinist and atheist ideas, Riza believed “Turkey was the Japan of the Near East”⁸². Absorbed specifically by the way in which the Japanese had been able to adopt western science and technology without losing their spiritual core, the CUP replaced religion with science: “an educated man needs to know nothing other than science and technology; science has reached such a level that all things are knowable”⁸³. The CUP was made up of “political reformers and ardent nationalists of the late

Revolution overthrew the Hamidian regime under the slogan of „Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and Justice”, aiming for a secular parliamentary democracy.

⁷⁶ Although the CUP sprung in firm opposition to Abdülhamid II, the realities of exercising power after 1908 compelled it to follow his policies more often than it would have liked. The preservation of Hamidian institutions was natural, lessened the opposition and facilitated the control over the state apparatus.

⁷⁷ Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, Oxford University Press, London, 1995, p.8.

⁷⁸ Amr Hamzawy, Nathan J. Brown, “The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamist Participation in a Closing Political Environment”, in *Carnegie Papers*, No. 19, March 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p.3.

⁷⁹ Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement*, Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, 2013, p. 25.

⁸⁰ Ottomanism was the view in which all the peoples of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Empire could coexist and be united by a common commitment to the Empire, arguing that the result of separatist movements was an outcome of the oppressive policies of Abdülhamid II. Ultimately, Prince Sabahaddin and his followers ended leaving the CUP over disagreements.

⁸¹ Riza became the first President of the the lower house of the Ottoman parliament in 1908 and in 1912, the President of the Upper House.

⁸² Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, Routledge, London, 2014, p.40.

⁸³ Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, cit., p.12.

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries”⁸⁴, whom adopted and adapted⁸⁵ social Darwinism.

Emerging after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the MB considered that the British occupation wrecked the Islamic state. Muslims failed their role of preserving the ideals and goals of Islam due to their weakness in fighting the western values, which were “responsible for all societal ills”⁸⁶ and demanded “an end to party rivalry, and a channeling of the political forces of the nation into a common front and single phalanx”⁸⁷, which would promote the Truth and Revelation of Prophet Muhammad. For the MB, there was “little or no room for conflicting interpretations of the religious norms and scriptures that serve as the basis of the party’s program and of laws which it seeks to impose on all of society”⁸⁸.

*

Several conclusions must be drawn from the comparison: firstly, the paramilitary branches, the secret nature of the organizations (or parts of them) and their use of violence derived from the oppressive nature of the two political systems. Secondly, the westernization of the actors leading the central administration of the Empire was led by non-Muslims and followed by Muslims; as a result, the Turkish Ulema, due to its close adherence to the establishment, was unable to produce ideologies that challenged the westernization movement, leaving the effervescent public discontent with no strong Islamic guiding ideology. Thirdly, the role played by educational reform in the development of elites on one side of the cleavage or the other is directly dependent on the ideological orientation of the entity providing it – if an oppressive regime lays the basis for extensive, large-scale education, inevitably such developments will foster the emergence of opposition. On the other side, if the state fails to deliver such services, organizations in opposition will substitute such services, gaining popular support and strengthening opposition.

⁸⁴ Charles H. Page, “Young Turks in Sociology: Yesterday and Today” in *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 1 Winter 1986, p. 158.

⁸⁵ Turks were positioned on the lowest ranks by Darwin; however, the leaders of the CUP remained adepts of popular biological materialist theories of the mid-nineteenth century, with a special focus on race. This, combined with the participation of many non-Turk members in the formation and activities of the CUP prevented the Young Turks from explicitly focusing on race until in its first stages of development.

⁸⁶ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, *Egypt Islam And Democracy: Critical Essays*, American University Press, Cairo, 2002, p.39.

⁸⁷ Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (editors), *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden*, Princeton University Press, 2009, p.74.

⁸⁸ Richard Gunther, Larry Diamond, “Species of Political Parties...cit.”, p. 182.

Although Egyptian intellectuals such as Hasan Attar, al-Jabarti and Rifa'ah Raifi'al Tahtawi had an initial response to western culture that was identical to that of Ottoman intellectuals in the capital of the Empire, "Egypt's political culture suffered from the consequences of restricted democratic practice, and constitutionalism was undermined by politicians who ruled according to their own arbitrary standards."⁸⁹ As Hanioglu illustrates, the causes of this divergent development as dependent upon the historical context: in contrast to Egypt, "Ottoman statesmen held their Empire to be geographically European and believed that their destiny lay with Europe"⁹⁰. Therefore, the ideological resistance to Europeanization was not as strong as in Egypt, since westernization was seen as a tool serving the saving of the Empire, not as the materialization of its enemy.

In this context, however, neither the CUP nor the MB could connect the civil society to the state. Consequently, as stressed by Arend Lijphart, the more a party aiming to participate in governing is forced outside the political system, the more it resorts to alternative means of generating outputs, transforming oppression into radicalization. On the opposite side, the process could be reversed if the group can take part in exercising power, its behavior and position within the system becoming self-regulating. Amongst Lijphart's models, the two-party system model is dominated by a dichotomy between two large parties which differ mainly on socio-economic issues, represented in Figure 8.

By replacing the Left-Right dichotomy with the modernists - Islamic revivalists' cleavage, the rationale applies to the context of Turkish and Egyptian elites; the number of voters is replaced with number of subjects; the dotted line represents the relative number of subjects adhering to an ideology. If combining Hanioglu's observations and Lijphart adapted theory, in the Ottoman case the *floating subjects* were a volatile mass that had access to power or the administrative apparatus, due to the sovereign nature of the political system (Figure 9). In the case of Egypt, the space covered by *floating subjects* represents the core of the cleavage: since Islamists were forced outside of the political arena by the European domination and had no opportunity to cooperate with the secular actors, the Islamic revivalist elites were secluded into radicalization (Figure 10). By applying the concept of *peripheliaty* to Lijphart two-party systems, the graphic representation of the latter could be interpreted both *horizontally* and *vertically*, both cases becoming the exemplification of the structuralist explanation put forward in the previous chapters. If the first form of cleavage in the two political formations sprung vertically, then the two-party system model contextualized as the structural representation of the prevailing ideological cleavage sheds light on the causes of the divergent ideological

⁸⁹ Selma Botman, "The liberal age, 1923-1952"...cit., p. 293.

⁹⁰ Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, cit., p.88.

development of the CUP and the MB: the ideology standing as basis for radicalism was a result of the configuration of the political system, depending on which group was governing and which group represented peripheral opposition.

If the most abrupt ideological cleavage manifested in the case of Abdülhamid's double dilemma occurred between the political system (encompassing the Sultan, the governing and non-governing elites and the civil society) and the interests of the Great Powers, in the case of Egypt the dominant cleavage occurred between the civil society and the political formation, which became synonymous with the local versus foreign dichotomy.

Bringing about a void between the rulers and the ruled, "the evenly matched contest between indigenous and foreign political focus generally had a disruptive effect on the integration of the political process"⁹¹. The dynasty, the governing elites and foreign interests were merging into the structure of the state, while local manifestations of political participation were forced to operate exclusively within the civil society if they had non-secular ideologies. As a result, the variation of the ideological orientation of the governing, determined the ideological nature of opposition, in a negative correlation: if Hamidian authoritarianism was Islamic revivalist, then radical opposition was secular; if the European-controlled authoritarian system was secular, then radical opposition was Islamic.

Conclusions

The limitations of each political system resulted into the radicalization of the MB and the CUP, which were "inevitably constrained by the strategic imperatives imposed by the system of competition in which they operated"⁹². Authoritarianism prevented their institutionalization and determined their radicalization. However, in both cases, the rejection of the regime (as the voice of secularization or re-Islamization) expressed "democracy-compatible" patterns⁹³, illustrating a persistent fallacy in understanding the patterns of contemporary political participation attempts in MENA: inclusive participation and democratization are not synonymous with secularization.

The constraints imposed by the political system upon party development were directly linked to the position of the first predominant ideological cleavage, which was determined by the degree of penetration of foreign pressures into domestic politics. In the case of the future Turkish system, all major reforms of the XIXth century could be accounted as reactions

⁹¹ Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.), *The Politics of Developing Areas*, cit., p. 384.

⁹² Peter Mair, *Party System Change ... cit.*, p.21.

⁹³ Olivier Roy, "The Transformation of the Arab World" in *Journal of Democracy*, , Volume 23, Number 3 July 2012, p.10.

to the decline of the Empire. The necessity of strategic diplomatic representation triggered elite modernization and provided them the opportunity to acquire autonomy. Although Abdülhamid's regime was authoritarian, it had to provide a certain degree of class circulation at the cost of ideology, which gave the possibility of marginal elites to start the process of becoming a part of the governing machine. While in future Turkey governing elites were more diverse and on the road towards autonomy, Egypt witnessed the removal of local elites from the institutions in charge with the exercise of political power.

Consequently, the incapacity of the Egyptian state to conduct its own foreign policy impeded elite modernization and circulation between governing and non-governing elites. Nevertheless, the Ali dynasty's failed attempts to modernization created the opportunity for the opposition to mobilize and substitute the functions of the state, facilitating the process of gaining faithful adherents: the MB would come to "resemble a state with its armies, hospitals, schools, factories and companies"⁹⁴. On the other side, the more successful Western inspired Hamidian educational reforms gave birth to a new class of elites that responded in ideological opposition to authoritarianism, via radical secularism.

In this context, both the CUP and the MB emerged as mass parties with a large base of permanently active members, robust and well-organized structure and extensive supportive (local) organizations between which regularized ties and communication existed. Both sought to penetrate various spheres of social life, developed paramilitary branches which functioned in secrecy and were influenced by the nature and provider of education. Both were determined to capture power, resorting to aggressive means for making demands on the system. Furthermore, the MB and the CUP had strongly articulated ideologies which were rigid, exclusive and based on notions of popular sovereignty and tyrannicide. Although both groups' ideologies took the guise of a panacea for all societal ills, the CUP's *weltanschauung* derived from social-Darwinism and nationalism, whereas the MB's ideas were the continuation of the Islamic faith.

Therefore, if the significant distinction between the CUP and MB manifested at the core of their ideologies and their ideologies developed in opposition to the state, then radicalization is not determined by ideology, but a result of the socio-political processes triggered by the system in which the groups operate. The incapacity of the CUP and the MB to institutionalize was a consequence of oppressive authoritarianism - both became *de jure* political actors as soon as the opportunity occurred. After the 1908 revolution, the CUP became a mass party, which grew and became increasingly institutionalized, although its "power could not be rendered legitimate and participatory"⁹⁵. Similarly, after attempting to participate in party politics prior to the 1952 revolution and managing to be marginally and unofficially a part of the political

⁹⁴ Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, cit., p. 66.

⁹⁵ Sukru Hanioglu, *The Young Turks in Opposition*, cit., p. 88.

system during the Egyptian military regimes, the MB became fully institutionalized in 2011 - on April 30, 2011 a new political party emerged in the Egyptian political arena: “the popular Islamic movement long banned from politics, announced that it has formed a political party”⁹⁶.

Furthermore, both groups faced the necessity to topple a regime to institutionally enter the input–output paradigm of the political system. The Hamidian regime was ultimately terminated at the convergence of domestic and foreign pressures and the CUP experimented power exercise and failure after the 1908 Revolution. On the other side, the lack of foreign pressures on the governing body of Egypt placed the Brotherhood in an impossibility to govern after the 1952 Revolution, freezing the political cleavage.

If the case of the CUP reconfirmed that gaining power via revolutionary means does not bring about ideological moderation, the case of the MB indicated that stiff oppression does not either. The only path left to deradicalization and inclusion is the institutionalization of actors in opposition, which would provide them an opportunity to create outputs in accordance to their ideology, without having a monopoly on the use of force. Consequently, if such groups would gain power by winning elections and govern, the institutionalization dilemma would move to the international arena if the group would have an ideology situated at the periphery of the world system.

However, to make such a scenario possible, radical opposition should assimilate both formally and informally the rules of democratic competition. Islamist groups have been secluded in the international arena, oppressed in the domestic one and most of their democratic experiences proved that “formal rules about how political institutions are supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens”⁹⁷. If the Arab Spring could have been a momentum for fructifying the succession of a set of indigenous upheavals, it only affirmed a new missed opportunity. As the political formula of “western values” is proving to recoil at home, Western powers seemed to have returned to their ventriloquist practices in MENA. Forty years after Edward Said published his groundbreaking *Orientalism*, we are still struggling to disentangle the “profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of coexistence and humanistic enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control and external enlargement of horizons.”⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Amro Hassan, *Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood creates political party*, Los Angeles Times, 30 April 2011 <<http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/30/world/la-fg-egypt-brotherhood-20110501>>, viewed 13 March 2014.

⁹⁷ Guillermo O. Donnell, „Illusions About Consolidation” in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press, p.39.

⁹⁸ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Vintage Books – A division of Random House, New York, 25th Anniversary Edition with a New Preface of the Author, 2003, Preface.

Annexes




Fig. 1. Parties of the cadre or caucus type




Fig. 2. Mass parties act as links between state and civil society




Fig. 3. Mass parties act as links between state and civil society

Fig. 1, 2, 3. The position of the political party in relation to the state and the civil society⁹⁹




Fig. 4. Variation of Ideological Orientation of the Governing¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models...cit.", pp. 10-13.

¹⁰⁰ Author's own chart.




Fig.5. The Urabi Revolution¹⁰¹




Fig. 6. The Hamidian regime¹⁰²




Fig. 7. Numeracy estimates in percent 1820- 1920 (Data refers to birth decadal average)¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Author's own diagram.

¹⁰² Author's own diagram.

¹⁰³ Data Source: The Clio Infra Project.




Fig. 8. Lijphart's majoritarian model¹⁰⁴




Fig. 9. Lijphart's theory applied to Turkish elites¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Arend Lijphart, *Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Governments in Twenty-one countries*, Yale University Press, USA, 1984, p.109.

¹⁰⁵ Author's own diagram.




Fig. 10. Lijphart's theory applied to Egyptian Elites¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Author's own diagram.